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Abstract
Contemporary urban growth in many cities in Latin American and Africa has been accompanied by unprece-
dented levels of urban violence. Latin America epitomizes this trend as three of the world’s most dangerous 
cities, Ciudad Juárez, San Pedro Sula, and Caracas, are located within this region (JÁCOME; GRATIUS, 2011, p. 
2). Of these three, Caracas is notable because its exorbitant homicide rate cannot be explicitly attributed to 
the illicit drug trade-cartel wars that consume Mexico, nor is it represented by the civil con lict-gang violence 
that af licts Central America. Moreover, the Venezuelan context is further distinguished as inequality, which is 
consistently cited as the primary catalyst for the emergence of everyday reactionary violence, is not overtly 
characteristic of the contemporary situation. Rather, caraqueño insecurity has largely been attributed to the 
exacerbation of social factors that perpetuate violence as “[…] an end in itself or a [mechanism] to injure/
eliminate another person in order to resolve an interpersonal con lict […]” (SANJUÁN, 2002, p. 95). Based 
on this reality, this work proposes the inclusion of socio-spatial interventions into contemporary prevention 
initiatives. Spatial interventions have shown a “[…] signi icant capacity to prevent the occurrence of violence 
in areas that are either totally or partially excluded from economic development and larger society […]” (DÍAZ; 
MELLER, 2012, p. 23). Implications of this work have the capacity to augment predominantly technical vio-
lence prevention precedent and enhance knowledge on alternative mechanisms to prevent insecurity. This 
study employs a comprehensive literature review in conjunction with data analyses in the development of 
a spatial proposal for Caracas.
Keywords: Urban violence prevention. Socio-spatial intervention. Latin American urban development.
Resumo
O crescimento urbano contemporâneo em muitas cidades da América Latina e da África tem sido acompanhado 
por níveis sem precedentes de violência urbana. No entanto, a América Latina resume mais essa tendência: 
três das cidades mais perigosas do mundo são localizadas na região: Ciudad Juárez, San Pedro Sula e Caracas 
(JÁCOME; GRATIUS, 2011, p. 2). Dessas três, Caracas é particular. Sua taxa exorbitante de homicídios não pode 
ser atribuída às guerras dos cartéis de drogas ilícitas que consomem o México, nem é representativa da violência urbe. Revista Brasileira de Gestão Urbana (Brazilian Journal of Urban Management), v. 6, n. 2, p. 201-217, maio/ago. 2014
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Introduction
In 2011, the World Development Report calculated 
that 25% of the world’s population lives with 
levels of violence that have “trans-generational 
repercussions” (ADAMS, 2012, p. 1). This violence 
has shifted from the notions of civil war and 
con lict to contemporarily focus more on criminal 
activity, terrorism, and civil unrest. Consequently, 
the spatial distribution of violence has deviated 
from the locations of historic transgressions, with 
violence increasingly experienced in the expanding 
cities of Latin America and Africa.
Latin America is notable in this context as nearly 
80% of the region’s population resides in urban areas 
that are considered the world’s most dangerous 
(SALIEZ et al., 2012). In particular, three cities 
epitomize this reality: Ciudad Juárez, Mexico; San 
Pedro Sula, Honduras; and Caracas, Venezuela. These 
cities are considered three of the most dangerous 
on the planet due to their exorbitant homicide rates. 
Yet among these three, the Venezuelan capital is 
particularly notable since local violence cannot be 
predominantly attributed to the illicit drug trade-
cartel wars that consume Mexico, nor is it due 
to the civil con lict-gang violence that has largely 
characterized Central America since the 1990s. 
Venezuela, in comparison, boasts a gross domestic 
product per capita that is higher than the regional 
average due to oil deposits, which are estimated to 
be the  ifth-largest known reserves in the world 
(SALIEZ et al., 2012, p. 41). Furthermore, over the 
last two decades, the capital has experienced marked 
reductions in poverty and urban inequality, the 
latter of which is consistently cited as the primary 
catalyst for the emergence of everyday reactionary 
violence (FAJNZYLBER; LEDERMAN; LOAYZA, 2002; 
VANDERSCHUEREN, 1996). Nevertheless, homicides 
in the capital metropolis have increased by 506% 
since 1990 (SANJUÁN, 2002, p. 94) and recently 
reached 130 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, 
more than double the rate for the remainder of the 
country (GRATIUS; VALENÇA, 2011, p. 11).
To address the increasing phenomenon of 
contemporary violence, the following multi-level study 
is organized to expose the urban factors that have 
increased the propensity for violent and criminal 
actions in Caracas. This examination is facilitated 
by a conceptual grounding in the theory of violence 
and its forms. The incidence of violence in cities 
and the larger relationship between urban processes 
and insecurity is subsequently addressed, before the 
experience of urbanization in Venezuela is appraised 
to determine its in luence on the contemporary 
exacerbation of caraqueño insecurity. A secondary 
analysis of political, economic, and social phenomena 
is likewise included, as violence occurs in a milieu of 
societal development that is similarly determinant.
Following this preliminary study, a set of hypo-
thetical socio-spatial interventions is proposed to 
de gangues que aϔlige a América Central. Além disso, o contexto venezuelano é distinto, porque a desigualdade, 
constantemente citada como o principal catalisador para o surgimento de violência reacionária não é 
característica em aprofundamento da situação contemporânea. A insegurança caraquenha, pelo contrário, tem 
sido amplamente atribuída à exacerbação de determinados fatores sociais, perpetuando a violência como 
“[...] um ϔim em si mesmo ou um [mecanismo] para ferir/eliminar outra pessoa, a ϔim de resolver um conϔlito 
interpessoal [...]” (SANJUÁN, 2002, p. 95). Por conta dessa realidade, este trabalho propõe a inclusão de 
intervenções socioespaciais em iniciativas de prevenção contemporâneos. Intervenções espaciais têm mostrado 
uma “[...] signiϔicativa capacidade de prevenir a ocorrência de violência nas áreas que são total ou parcialmente 
excluídas do desenvolvimento econômico e da sociedade em geral [...]” (DÍAZ; MELLER, 2012, p. 23). Implicações 
deste trabalho podem levar ao desenvolvimento de precedente de prevenção da violência predominantemente 
técnico e assim melhorar o conhecimento sobre os mecanismos alternativos para evitar a insegurança. Este 
estudo emprega uma ampla revisão da literatura em conjunto com análises de dados para o desenvolvimento 
de uma proposta espacial para Caracas.
Palavras-chave: Prevenção da violência urbana. Intervenção socioespacial. Desenvolvimento urbano da 
América Latina.urbe. Revista Brasileira de Gestão Urbana (Brazilian Journal of Urban Management), v. 6, n. 2, p. 201-217, maio/ago. 2014
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address the complexity of violence in the urban 
typology in which it concentrates: informal com-
munities of the Venezuelan capital. These proposals 
focus speci ically on spatial intervention, which 
has shown a 
[…] signi icant capacity to prevent the occurrence 
of violence in extensive areas of Latin America 
that are either totally or partially excluded from 
economic development and larger society […] 
(DÍAZ; MELLER, 2012, p. 23). 
Moreover, spatial intervention provides a me-
c h a    n  ism to “[…] weave together socio-cultural 
development aspects, economic asp  ects, as well as 
operation and maintenance solutions […]” and thus     
facilitate the comprehensive functionality necessary 
to prevent urban insecurity (KRAUSE, 2011, p. 108).
Motivation for this work stems from the recently 
enacted Gran Mision A Toda Vida Venezuela por una 
Convivencia Segura, a contemporary Venezuelan 
initiative for public safety on the national level. 
The central objective of the Gran Mision is to “[…] 
transform structural, situational, and institutional 
factors that generate violence and crime […]” without 
requiring “[…] more police, more jails, or greater 
penalization […]” (GOBIERNO BOLIVARIANO DE 
VENEZUELA, 2012). However, as recent protests 
have demonstrated, the programs of the Gran Mision 
have had little effect repressing the occurrence of 
violence in Caracas. Therefore, this work attempts 
to contribute to the development of comprehensive 
security planning for the caraqueño communities 
most affected by violence while simultaneously 
encouraging the incorporation of spatial attributes 
within prevention programming for similar situations 
of urban insecurity.
Violence: Categories and instigators
To suf iciently understand the contemporary 
situation of Caracas, it is necessary to  irst 
conceptualize the theory of violence, particularly 
in relation to cities. The World Health Organization 
(WHO) de ines violence as 
[…] the intentional use of physical force or power, 
threatened or actual, against oneself, another 
person, or a group, that either results in or has a 
high likelihood of resulting in injury or death […] 
(KRUG; DAHLBERG; MERCY, 2002, p. 4). 
In addition to these tangible outcomes, the WHO 
also includes the less-obvious consequences of violent 
behavior, “such as psychological harm, deprivation, 
and mal-development that compromise the well-
being of individuals, families, and communities 
[…]” (KRUG; DAHLBERG; MERCY, 2002, p. 4). This 
complexity within the de inition alludes to the 
multiple attributes and in luences of the concept 
and has led social scientists to further distinguish 
between the various forms of violence. In its most 
encompassing classi ication, violence is differentiated 
into direct, structural, and cultural forms, with 
direct  violence composing the most common 
understandings of the term : direct violence is the 
direct in liction of physical or psychological harm on 
another individual resulting in intentional fatalities, 
assault, and/or sexual harassment (MUGGAH, 2012, 
p. 19).
The occurrence of direct violence generates 
uncertainty, which is expressed as fear and insecurity, 
thus promoting the notion that particular institutions 
or cultural establishments require protection 
(MOSER, 2004, p. 4). To generate such protection, 
mechanisms are constructed to negate this threat. 
Yet, intrinsic to many of these mechanisms are 
structural or institutional attributes that exclude 
or restrict certain portions of a population from 
achieving a just and equitable lifestyle. In response 
to this reality, the concept of structural violence 
was introduced by Galtung (1969) to address 
the issue of “[…] how various institutions and 
organizations cause harm to others as a normal 
consequence of the way they are structured and 
operate […]” (SANTA-BARBARA, 2007, p. 234). 
The injustices (real or perceived) derived from 
structural violence may, in turn, “[…] provoke 
direct violence as a response to exclusion from 
social, political, or economic systems […]” (MARC; 
WILLMAN, 2010, p. 11). Moreover, these forms of 
structural and direct violence can be exacerbated 
by cultural violence, which is the “[…] justi ication 
of direct and structural forms through nationalism, 
racism, sexism, and other types of discrimination 
and prejudice […]” (FISCHER, 2007, p. 188).urbe. Revista Brasileira de Gestão Urbana (Brazilian Journal of Urban Management), v. 6, n. 2, p. 201-217, maio/ago. 2014
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A secondary classi ication of violence evaluates 
the motivation behind violent actions. These 
motivations fall into three broad characterizations, 
social, economic, and political, which can degrade 
into further forms of violence when con lict arises 
from the incompatible or contradictory goals of 
individuals or groups. Moser and McIlwaine (2004) 
contextualize the intentionality in these forms:
•  Social violence: violence motivated by the 
will to achieve or maintain social power 
and control;
•  Economic violence: violence motivated by 
material gain, which can take the form of street 
crime, drug-related violence, or kidnapping;
•  And Political violence: violence inspired 
by the will to win or hold political power 
(FISCHER, 2007, p. 60).
The  inal form, political violence, can have a range 
of violent outcomes, such as “[…] the normalization 
of violence, [deriving] a system of norms, values, 
or attitudes which allow, or even stimulate, the 
use of violence […]”, and can culminate in a form 
of state violence perpetrated through a lack of 
reform within the police and judiciary systems 
or the inability to provide legitimate institutional 
control over violence (AGOSTINI et al., 2010, p. 3). 
The violence in Venezuela speci ically re lects this 
distinction, as even President Chávez has justi ied 
the violent appropriation of private property as an 
action against social injustice (JÁCOME; GRATIUS, 
2011).
Due to the multifaceted and interrelated nature 
of violence, the need to comprehensively evaluate 
the phenomenon by examining factors that in luence 
behavior or aspects that increase the risk of 
committing or becoming a victim of violence became 
obvious to many scholars early in the development 
of conceptual theory. The Social Disorganization 
Theory predicted that many risks for violence 
were aggravated by the socio-spatial characteristics 
of the cities themselves. This idea was advanced 
through the Ecological Systems Theory, which sought 
to demonstrate that no single cause determined 
or explained violence; rather, multiple types of 
nested-factors, with bi-directional in luences in and 
between each other at different levels, combined 
to contribute to violence in an overlapping and 
continuous manner (Figure 1) (KRUG; DAHLBERG; 
MERCY, 2002).
In line with the Ecological Systems Theory, urban 
violence has been described as following a similar, 
concomitant pattern: 
[…] rapid growth of cities feeds the chaotic 
formation of [marginal areas], in which over-
crowding and competition for scarce resources 
combine with weak state security presence to foster 
criminality and violence […] (MARC; WILLMAN, 
2010, p. 15).
 The urban growth rate has been directly 
attributed to enhanced violence (compared with 
city size or population density) as rapid urban 
growth contributes to infrastructure de iciencies 
that exacerbate the everyday pressures of earning 
a living and raising a family, increasing tensions 
within families and communities and making it 
easier for everyday con licts to escalate into violence 
(MARC; WILLMAN, 2010). Poor spatial allotments can 
further amplify the propensity for con lict, creating 
“[…] situational opportunities for perpetrators to 
commit crimes without being seen or pursued by 
neighbors or police […]” (MARC; WILLMAN, 2010, 
p. 66). Similarly, limited service provisions in one 
Figure 1 - The nested factors of the Ecological Systems Theory
Source: KRUG; DAHLBERG; MERCY, 2002.urbe. Revista Brasileira de Gestão Urbana (Brazilian Journal of Urban Management), v. 6, n. 2, p. 201-217, maio/ago. 2014
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community as opposed to another exacerbate a 
sense of social exclusion, which is itself a driver of 
violence, that then has the power to convert areas 
of a city into “no-go zones” for non-residents and 
law enforcement professionals (MARC; WILLMAN, 
2010, p. 26). In this way, the real and perceived 
threats of violence combine to generate what Agbola 
(1997) has termed an 
[…] architecture of fear”: “increasingly higher walls 
and barriers, more elaborate security systems, 
the presence of private security, and, often, a 
stronger police presence in wealthier areas […] 
(AGBOLA,1997, p. 26). 
Such architecture fragments public space, breaks 
down social cohesion, perpetuates widespread 
insecurity, and, ultimately, diminishes the overall 
quality of urban life.
Venezuelan urbanization and the 
propensity for violence
The contemporary exacerbation of urban in-
security in Caracas can be signi icantly attributed to 
processes of spatial organization that have occurred 
since the early 20th century. By the beginning of 
the 1930s, oil and the state had come to dominate 
the economy and processes of urban expansion in 
Caracas (BRICEÑO-LEÓN, 2007). Programs such 
as the Plan Rotival, which sought to order urban 
expansion through a system of straight boulevards 
and diagonal avenues, epitomized this trend, as 
government policy reserved the city center for 
commercial and of ice use and pushed the metropolis 
into its modern linear shape, which made urban 
transportation necessary for city life (STANN, 1975). 
The purchase of large single tracts of land in the 
city’s east and their simultaneous subdivision and 
development into housing at a relatively narrow 
Figure 2 - The Super Bloque of January 23 shortly after construction
Source: CENTENARIO DE VILLANUEVA, 2011.urbe. Revista Brasileira de Gestão Urbana (Brazilian Journal of Urban Management), v. 6, n. 2, p. 201-217, maio/ago. 2014
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price range reinforced the segregation initiated 
by such early planning endeavors (STANN, 1975, 
p. 160). Thus, “[…] the west became home to the 
worker, while the wealthy and near-wealthy went 
east […]” (STANN, 1975, p. 159).
During the 1950s, federal control of urbanization 
continued as oil productivity doubled and the gross 
national product increased by 95% (RAY, 1969, p. 
5). Consequent rural-urban migration and informal 
urbanization were strongly controlled as the 
regime sought to address low-income populations 
through a series of Corbuserian-in luenced urban 
renewal projects, which were built to accommodate 
180,000 low-income residents across the capital 
and neighboring municipalities (Figure 2) (KÜHN, 
2013, p. 195). However, the Revolution of January in 
1958 ushered in a new and entirely unprecedented 
phase of informal development. Restrictions on land 
settlement were lifted, and families immediately 
poured out of crowded informal developments to 
claim vacant land on the outskirts of the city. 
When families, still in the countryside, heard 
about the new opportunities, the  low of migration 
sped up tremendously, thus increasing further 
demand for new development [in Caracas] (RAY, 
1969, p. 32). 
Such was the rate of growth that an of icial 
report estimated that 100 new dwellings were 
being erected in informal settlements daily (RAY, 
1969). Not surprisingly, most of these settlements, 
locally known as barrios, “[…] trace their origin 
back to those  irst twenty-four months following 
the revolution than any other period” in caraqueño 
history (RAY, 1969, p. 6).
In response to the explosive growth experienced 
in Caracas in the late 1950s, the Central Of ice 
of Coordination and Planning (CORDIPLAN) was 
created to “[…] propose the general framework for 
physical and spatial planning on a national scale […]” 
(FRIEDMANN, 1965, p. 17). Over the ensuing decade, 
CORDIPLAN encouraged the growth of alternative 
urban poles across the country. However, the Middle 
Eastern oil embargo of the early 1970s intensi ied 
the patterns of territorial occupation in Caracas 
as laborers from neighboring countries  locked 
to the Venezuelan capital, locating predominantly 
in the barrios (BRICEÑO-LEÓN, 2007). Yet after 
a few years of substantial growth, a shift in the 
dynamics of oil wealth and a presidential decree 
forbidding the establishment of new factories in 
Caracas altered incomes (SÁNCHEZ, 2013), which 
had allowed families to improve their dwellings 
within  ive years in the 1960s (BRICEÑO-LEÓN, 
2007). Subsequently, 
[…] a process of generalized urban deterioration 
set in, where congestion and decline, [caused] by 
the decreasing availability of urban plots, [saw] 
families resort to building 2, 3, or even 7 stories 
on to already precarious dwellings […] (BRICEÑO-
LEÓN, 2007, p. 99). 
Figure 3 - The extreme congestion of the barrios
Source: BRILLEMBOURG; KLUMPNER; SCHWARTZ, 2011.urbe. Revista Brasileira de Gestão Urbana (Brazilian Journal of Urban Management), v. 6, n. 2, p. 201-217, maio/ago. 2014
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Barrio density across the metropolis corres-
pondingly grew to six times that of the “formal” 
city (Figure 3) (ALEMÁN, 2008). Spatially, this 
density encouraged violence and crime because 
it inhibited opportunities for natural surveillance. 
From an environmental psychology perspective, this 
density also promoted con licts between people, 
[…] both because of aggression that appears 
with many people and few effective norms for 
cohabitation but also because unplanned urban 
growth and subsequent densi ication [produced] 
tortuous territories that [were] easily controlled 
by criminal groups and refractory to ef icient and 
secure action by the police […] (BRICEÑO-LEÓN, 
2005, p. 1640).
Due to extreme urban consolidation and 
the     growth of insecurity, Caracas subsequently 
experienced a process of de-densi ication from the 
1980s onward. Both formal and informal urban 
sprawl expanded the city to the east (AZZELLINI; 
LANZ; WILDNER, 2013). The convergence of these 
contradictory processes fomented the propagation 
of forti ied enclaves: apartment high-rises, gated 
communities, peripheral of ice complexes, and 
shopping centers, guarded by private security 
and high-tech surveillance. The reproduction of 
these developments in the 1990s reiterated socio-
economic divisions as the growth of forti ied 
enclaves for the elite coincided with 30% of the 
urban population, exclusively in the barrios, lacking 
municipal connection to water and sanitation 
systems (AZZELLINI; LANZ; WILDNER, 2013, p. 
15). However, the largely positive reception of 
many enclaves (including by the poor, who also 
experienced closed shopping centers as “safe places 
in which to spend their leisure” (BRICEÑO-LEÓN, 
2007, p. 98) created a “[…] public space fragmented 
and articulated in terms of rigid separations […]” 
(CALDEIRA, 2000, p. 4).
The fragmentation of public space has constrained 
social activities and promoted the adoption of 
radical changes in habits, cultural routines, and 
collective behavior. Social mixing and interaction 
are deliberately avoided, public space is used only 
exclusively, and the traditional places of social 
encounter, such as parks, squares, and even streets, 
have either lost their function and are abandoned 
or are used only in transit (ALEMÁN, 2008). These 
voids, which exemplify structural violence, have 
enabled mass media – especially television – to 
become disproportionately more important “as a 
means for people who are isolated from each other 
to make sense of their lives” (ADAMS, 2012, p. 32).
Yet, mass media has equally been shown to 
exacerbate the volatility of the situation, “[…] 
naturalizing the violence that is reported, trivializing 
other types of violence, and increasing fear and 
insecurity among the population” (ADAMS, 2012, p. 
17). Such uncertainty has perpetuated violence as   
it has “[…] reproduced and circulated stereotypes, 
stimulated scapegoating, and spurred increased 
segregation, negation of citizenship rights, and 
further aggression” (ADAMS, 2012, p. 27). With 
the ubiquitous presence of television in even the 
poorest urban homes, cultural consumption patterns 
have caused this information to spread massively 
(BRICEÑO-LEÓN; ZUBILLAGA, 2002). Therefore, the 
multiplication of panic, suspicion, and arbitrariness 
in social life have inhibited “[…] the mechanisms of 
informal social control and the dynamic interactions 
between residents and local institutions […]” (MARC; 
WILLMAN, 2010, p. 232). Consequently, a vicious 
cycle of crime and violence has become socialized 
in contemporary Caracas.
Supplemental instigators of 
violence in Venezuela
Contemporary violence in Caracas cannot be 
solely attributed to spatial processes of urbanization. 
The homicide rate, which was comparatively low 
during the period of rapid urban development, 
exploded as urban growth began to stabilize 
around the turn of the millennium. Furthermore, 
this homicide rate was attained despite reductions 
in the percentage of the population experiencing 
poverty and inequality. Therefore, it is necessary to 
evaluate other phenomena that have contributed to 
the substantial growth of violence in the Venezuelan 
capital.
The following sub-sections analyze the 
circumstances that are supplemental to the spatial 
development of the modern metropolis to further 
contextualize violence in contemporary Caracas. 
According to the forms of violence outlined in urbe. Revista Brasileira de Gestão Urbana (Brazilian Journal of Urban Management), v. 6, n. 2, p. 201-217, maio/ago. 2014
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the  irst section, these segments will characterize 
violence into political, social, and economic 
categories, as growth in the violence of Caracas has 
transpired within a milieu of political adjustment, 
market  luctuation, and the increasingly asymmetrical 
development of social relations (SANJUÁN, 1998).
Political factors of violence
Since the onset of increased urban violence in 
the Venezuelan capital in the 1980s, the notion 
that insecurity was resolved through the use of 
reactionary violence has become progressively 
more socialized. In February 1989, the government 
of Carlos Andres Perez epitomized this trend, 
deploying the military to violently end the unrest 
due to working-class protests. An uncompromising 
reaction plunged the capital into violence shortly 
thereafter, when military personnel took to the 
streets in 1992 with the objective of occupying 
the government. The accompanying increase in 
violence appeared to be the product of a severe 
institutional crisis that “[…] immersed Venezuela 
in a kind of anomie, [which] lasted until an elected 
president again took of ice in 1995 […]” (BRICEÑO-
LEÓN, 2007, p. 92). Although homicide numbers 
stabilized at around 4,000 per year during that 
time, the situation changed dramatically in 1999 
when Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez was elected 
president. Beginning in that year, the number of 
homicides grew nationally, surpassing 13,000 in 
2003 (BRICEÑO-LEÓN, 2007, p. 93).
Of particular in luence in the election of Chávez 
was the apparent legitimization of what Holston 
(2007) has called “insurgent citizenship”: the 
coalescence of insurgent movements that “[…] 
rede ine the nature of social incorporation and the 
distribution of resources […]”. According to Holston, 
these movements often derive from the construction 
of informal communities on the margins of cities 
and society, as informal urban dwellers create a vast 
new city while simultaneously proposing a different 
order of citizenship (HOLSTON, 2007). The election 
of Chávez afforded this alternative citizenship a 
platform to challenge the entrenched formulations 
of order and repression. Accordingly, the political 
sphere became progressively more polarized, which 
provoked an increasingly political-cultural form 
of violence (Chavismo vs. Oposición) from the year 
2000 onward. “The rise of political tensions led 
to open confrontation in signi icant events – the 
2002 coup, the oil strike in 2004, and street 
confrontations between supporters and opponents 
of the government […]”, thus contributing to a 
marked overall de-institutionalization of security 
(ZUBILLAGA, 2013, p. 110). Subsequently, the 
predominant sentiment resulting from political 
violence became the fear “[…] of being attacked or 
invaded by political opponents in periods of high 
confrontation […]” (ZUBILLAGA, 2013, p. 115).
Social factors of violence
As a consequence of this fear, alternative and 
predominantly individual means to ensure personal 
security have been adopted by the majority of the 
population. These means fall along a continuum 
from defensive to perverse and extreme. Defensive 
responses have led to the widespread privatization 
of security, with an estimated 700,000 private 
security agents - double the number of policemen 
in Caracas - dispersed across the city (GRATIUS; 
VALENÇA, 2011). More perverse responses to violence 
have seen the formulation of contradictory social 
identities, which are restricted to individual areas 
of the city and validate violence against anyone 
who is not part of the more or less homogeneous 
world of “us” (ZUBILLAGA, 2013, p. 106). Perhaps 
the most extreme response to violence has been 
citizens’ increased approval of the right to kill: 60% 
support the right to kill to defend one’s property, 
whereas killing an individual who attacks the 
community was condoned by 33% of respondents 
(BRICEÑO-LEÓN; CAMARDIEL; AVILA, 2006). These 
reactions are exacerbated by citizens’ desire to buy 
 irearms, which, in 2004, attained 47.8% of the 
population (BRICEÑO-LEÓN, 2007). Some experts 
have noted that most legal and illegal weapons 
in Venezuela - between 8 and 15 million - are in 
civilian hands, which, in a country of approximately 
28 million inhabitants, “[…] indicates that nearly 
50% of the population is armed […]” (JÁCOME; 
GRATIUS, 2011, p. 3).
Not surprisingly, urban insecurity has become 
less instrumental (focused on a remunerative goal) 
and more relational, with 64% of the violence urbe. Revista Brasileira de Gestão Urbana (Brazilian Journal of Urban Management), v. 6, n. 2, p. 201-217, maio/ago. 2014
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in Caracas derived from  ights with friends or 
acquaintances of the most primary environment 
(SANJUÁN, 1998). Violence, in turn, has become 
“[…] an end in itself or its purpose is to injure or 
eliminate another person to resolve an interpersonal 
con lict […]” (SANJUÁN, 2002, p. 95). As a result, 
every citizen becomes a potential victim, and even 
neighbors become potential perpetrators. Therefore, 
community fragmentation has been promoted as fear 
has become widespread across the various social 
spaces of the metropolis. This fear has eroded the 
social fabric of communities as citizens, recognizing 
the lower probability of being a victim of violence 
at their residence (Table 1), have become prone to 
spend more time inside their households, promoting 
a process of communal “unsociability” (ZUBILLAGA, 
2013, p. 117).
Such withdrawal has facilitated a marked 
deterioration in the control of social networks 
and coexistence schemes, as communal reliance 
and trust have become unnecessary for both the 
individual and the group. Thus, violence has created 
an atmosphere in which everyday encounters with 
insecurity are perceived as a natural aspect of a 
perverse state of order, and fundamental elements 
of democracy, such as dialogue, negotiation of 
con lict, and the execution of political and civil 
citizenship, are no longer expected or necessary. 
Correspondingly, individualism and a lack of 
optimism have become “[…] inherent and constitutive 
facts of contemporary Venezuelan society that 
in luence shared expectations and the vision of the 
future […]” (SANJUÁN, 2002, p. 93). This lack of 
faith produces a feeling of hopelessness and often 
results in even more insecurity, as violence is no 
longer merely an aspect of survival in the city but 
rather a characteristic that is necessary to survive.
Economic factors of violence
The economic situation has compounded the 
occurrence of violence further, as the country has 
been plagued by price  luctuations and in lation over 
the last decade, which have made Caracas the most 
expensive city in the Americas (THE ECONOMIST 
INTELLIGENCE UNIT, 2013). The resultant economic 
violence derives from insuf icient employment 
opportunities; the of icial unemployment rate in 
Caracas has grown since the capital reduced its 
participation in national industrial production in 
the 1980s (MAYTÍN, 2013). Consequently, informal 
employment has become an integral aspect of the 
urban economy, representing 62% of all employment 
across the capital (BRICEÑO-LEÓN, 2007). Although 
not intrinsically violent, the informal economy 
has migrated toward violence for economic gain, 
including drugs and arms traf icking and especially 
kidnapping, as restrictions on informal sellers have 
increased. Moreover, available jobs in the service 
sector require educational achievement, which is 
inaccessible to the majority of adolescents from the 
barrios. Thus, perverse expressions of the informal 
economy are increasingly accepted by excluded 
youth, who strive for consumption patterns that 
“[…] cannot be satis ied with the conventional 
methods of work and savings […]” (BRICEÑO-LEÓN, 
2007, p. 95).
The growth of economic violence, in turn, has 
affected individuals’ capacity to improve their living 
conditions and to dissociate from perverse forms 
of informal employment. Violence propagates the 
fear of victimization and thus inhibits information 
 lows about jobs, delays the establishment of small 
shops or stalls, restricts productivity by limiting the 
number of hours of work performed, and depresses 
sales because potential purchasers do not go out 
at night (MUGGAH, 2012). Moreover, there is the 
additional expense that families and companies must 
bear, being obliged to allocate sizeable portions 
of their budgets to security: approximately 1.9% 
of the GDP per capita is spent on private security 
measures (BRICEÑO-LEÓN; ZUBILAGA, 2002).
Table 1 - Perceptions of the Locations of Violence in Caracas
In the Place of Residence (i.e., Home) 1.48%
In Public Spaces of the Residence Area 34.93%
In Public Spaces outside the Residence Area 26.45%
In Private Spaces (Ofﬁ ces, Workplaces, Restricted Areas, etc.) 16.25%
Private Vehicles & Public Transport 20.51%
No Declaration 0.38%
Total  100.00%
Source: ELJURI et al., 2010.urbe. Revista Brasileira de Gestão Urbana (Brazilian Journal of Urban Management), v. 6, n. 2, p. 201-217, maio/ago. 2014
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Additionally, it is necessary to consider the societal 
costs of insecurity, as de icient investment (both 
nationally and internationally) and the emigration 
of professionals and skilled workers perpetuate 
inferior services, such as those in the health sector 
(JÁCOME; GRATIUS, 2011). The populations residing 
in the barrios predominantly experience this burden, 
magnifying the discrepancies that concentrate in 
marginalized social strata. This concentration has 
largely negated the reductions of poverty and 
inequality achieved over the last 20 years1 and has 
exacerbated the occurrence of structural violence 
in the Venezuelan capital.
Proposal for prevention in Caracas
Due to the complex and multifaceted reality 
of violence in Caracas, a comparably manifold 
response has been required from the Venezuelan 
authorities. However, the Gran Mision a Toda 
Vida Venezuela por una Convivencia Segura, a 
national policy for public safety enacted in 2012, 
has done little to address the complexity of 
urban insecurity in Caracas. Preliminary stages 
of the initiative have predominantly focused on 
provisions for institutional strengthening, such as 
police reform and disarmament. Although they 
are imperative to the prevention of violence, these 
activities have signi icantly overlooked many daily 
experiences of insecurity, thus prolonging a form of 
political violence in which de icient governmental 
provisions for security normalize violent occurrences 
(AGOSTINI et al., 2010).
Consequently, the national government must 
advance violence prevention activities and 
supplement contemporary initiatives of the Gran 
Mision. Spatial intervention provides a signi icant 
opportunity as it has been shown to “[…] prevent 
the occurrence of violence in extensive areas of 
Latin America that are either totally or partially 
excluded from economic development and larger 
society.” (DÍAZ; MELLER, 2012, p. 23). Moreover, 
redevelopment of the built environment affords the 
capacity to weave together various socio-cultural 
aspects, developmental aspects, and economic aspects 
as well as operational and maintenance solutions 
(KRAUSE, 2011). This ability to comprehensively 
address violence is integral to its prevention as 
activities to reduce violence, like the occurrence 
of violence itself, must work on multiple and bi-
directional levels.
In accordance with the opportunity provided by 
spatial redevelopment, the following sub-sections 
propose hypothetical interventions for the barrios 
of Caracas, the urban typology in which violence 
concentrates. These proposals are presented 
to complement contemporary measures, which 
have been or continue to be enacted through the 
Gran Mision. They are proposed with a particular 
orientation toward the relevant actors within the 
Gran Mision, but they also focus on enhancing 
communities’ capacity to address the incidence of 
violence themselves.
Enhancing the physical presence of 
municipal institutions in the Barrios
As the spatial characteristics of the barrios-
often located on mountainous slopes and 
composed of a complex labyrinth of streets and 
alleyways - accentuate insuf icient municipal 
responses to violence in these settlements (BRICEÑO-
LEÓN, 2007), spatial intervention should enhance 
the physical presence of municipal institutions in 
affected communities. The establishment of better 
security and justice institutions could substantially 
reduce the occurrence of direct forms of violence, 
since 70% of households attribute insecurity to the 
de icient presence of police (ELJURI et al., 2010). 
Moreover, attending to the overall institutional 
de iciencies that characterize the barrios would 
address the structural forms of violence in licted 
on such communities and would likewise assist in 
reducing the expressions of cultural violence that 
have developed with the formulation of self-centered 
and divergent spatial identities.
To strengthen security and justice provisions 
in the barrios, precedent can be drawn from the 
1  Since 1990, Venezuela has experienced a marked reduction in poverty levels, with the percentage of the urban population living in poverty 
and extreme poverty decreasing from 49% to 28% in 2010. Urban inequality (represented by the Gini Coef icient) has similarly dropped 
to 0.39 in 2010 from a level of nearly 0.50 circa 1990 (SALIEZ et al., 2012). urbe. Revista Brasileira de Gestão Urbana (Brazilian Journal of Urban Management), v. 6, n. 2, p. 201-217, maio/ago. 2014
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municipalities of Cali and Bogotá, Colombia, where 
small, mobile police units, crime scene investigation 
facilities, and professional cohorts (Figure 4) 
have been installed to provide surveillance, legal 
procedures, and assistance in the resolution of 
everyday con licts (MARC; WILLMAN, 2010). The 
mobility of such facilities has enabled them to provide 
services to wider areas of informal settlements, 
thus addressing both direct and structural forms 
of violence experienced by these communities. 
Additionally, programming denouncing family and 
intimate partner violence challenged intrinsic 
Figure 4 - Mobile police facility, Bogotá, Colombia
Source: UNITED NATIONS HUMAN SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMME, 2011.
Figure 5 - Urban mobile library
Source: ELEVENTH STACK, 2009.urbe. Revista Brasileira de Gestão Urbana (Brazilian Journal of Urban Management), v. 6, n. 2, p. 201-217, maio/ago. 2014
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expressions of cultural violence and likewise 
achieved relative success (MARC; WILLMAN, 2010, 
p. 92).
In a similar vein, institutions such as clinics, 
libraries, or post of ices could be established 
through analogous spatial interventions to attend 
to the signi icant absence of such institutions 
in the barrios. Mobile facilities would address 
experiences of structural violence in informal 
communities. Furthermore, this intervention could 
also foster the communal appropriation of space 
because these institutions are often locations for 
congregation (Figure 5). The focus within such 
intervention is on encouraging an enhanced sense of 
territoriality (belonging to place) by residents while 
simultaneously increasing natural surveillance of 
streets and other public spaces. As the public realm 
in the barrios has become increasingly unused, the 
occurrence of violence has become more consistent. 
Therefore, enhanced surveillance and ownership 
could foster greater activity in public spaces and 
promote perceptions of communal safety.
Encouraging business establishment 
through legal and ﬁ  nancial measures
A comparable spatial mechanism through which 
activity has been encouraged in the public realm is 
the development of mixed commercial and residential 
corridors, particularly in areas of the city at risk for 
crime. These corridors facilitate pedestrian activity 
and enhance safety by increasing passive surveillance 
(Figure 6). Moreover, mixed-use corridors provide 
viable opportunities for capital generation in crime-
prone areas; thus, they diminish the experience of 
structural violence in communities excluded from 
the economic development of the formal economy. 
Such intervention likewise minimizes the need to 
resort to economic violence for  inancial gain.
Because barrio streets that have a commercial 
function are often particularly limited, the 
development of mixed-use corridors is appropriate 
to prevent violence in informal communities of 
the Venezuelan capital (ALEMÁN, 2008). However, 
additional measures should be developed to more 
speci ically address the situation of violence, 
particular to Caracas. Legal and  inancial measures 
should encourage single mothers to establish 
businesses through this type of intervention, as 
extreme poverty tends to concentrate in female-
headed households across the barrios, reiterating 
the structural violence in licted on informal 
communities (ALEMÁN, 2008). In combination 
with other municipal de iciencies, the structural 
violence experienced by youth in these households 
has a strong tendency to result in acts of social 
or economic violence across the larger community 
(CORREO DEL ORINOCO, 2013).
Therefore, facilitating the development of 
mixed-use corridors enhances violence prevention 
capabilities on various levels. Greater economic 
capacity of single mothers would enable them to 
challenge the forms of structural violence that 
Figure 6 - Enhanced public life in Medellín, Colombia
Source: UNITED NATIONS HUMAN SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMME, 2011.urbe. Revista Brasileira de Gestão Urbana (Brazilian Journal of Urban Management), v. 6, n. 2, p. 201-217, maio/ago. 2014
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have kept their families in poverty. Moreover, the 
opportunity to work from home would allow single 
mothers to attend to their children while engaging 
in economic activity. This is particularly important 
because a damaged relationship with the mother 
 igure is a common characteristic of perpetrators of 
violence in Caracas (CORREO DEL ORINOCO, 2013).
On the communal level, organizations run and 
managed by women “[…] are felt to be more 
successful in building sustainable social relations 
that, in turn, were thought to help prevent the 
incidence and spread of everyday violence […]” 
(MCILWAINE; MOSER, 2007, p. 135). The jobs 
and local markets created by such interventions 
could likewise reduce insecurity because they 
would increase pedestrian activities in the barrios 
and enhance passive surveillance. Moreover, job 
development and local markets would address 
the structural violence that has kept many adults 
unemployed since the capital reduced its percentage 
of industrial production in the 1980s. Therefore, legal 
and  inancial measures to encourage mixed-used 
development can help foment a virtuous circle of 
violence prevention and promote spaces of security 
within informal communities.
Promoting adolescent-developed 
& managed public spaces
Spatial intervention must also incorporate 
violence prevention for adolescents as this cohort is 
over-represented in the  igures on violence. Eighty 
percent of victims and 70% of homicide perpetrators 
are males between the ages of 15 and 44 years 
(GOBIERNO BOLIVARIANO DE VENEZUELAM, 
2012), although the majority of both victims and 
perpetrators are under 25 years (UNIVERSIDAD 
NACIONAL EXPERIMENTAL DE LA SEGURIDAD, 
2011). Much of this situation can be attributed to the 
municipal and spatial de iciencies that characterize 
the barrios. In the parish of Catia in the city’s west, 
for example, 45% of adolescents between the ages of 
16-25 years are not enrolled in secondary education 
due to de icient facilities (UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL 
EXPERIMENTAL DE LA SEGURIDAD, 2011). Moreover, 
95% of adolescents between 19-25 years in the 
parish do not participate in sports or other organized 
recreational activities due to a lack of provisions 
(UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL EXPERIMENTAL DE LA 
SEGURIDAD, 2011). Responses to such forms of 
structural violence often include acts of social 
or economic violence, which affect the larger 
community.
Accordingly, spatial intervention should focus 
on enhancing the accessibility of recreational 
facilities since exposure to such facilities offers the 
opportunity to form social norms while providing 
verbal skills that enable individuals to “[…] express 
feelings and manage con licts through negotiation 
and agreement […]” (BRICEÑO-LEÓN, 2005, p. 
1643). Precedent for such facilities can be drawn 
from existing programs, including the initiative 
Labrotorio de Artes Urbano (Tiuna El Fuerte) in 
Caracas, which provides a space in which the 
values of creativity, expression, and respect are 
encouraged in young urban inhabitants (Figure 7) 
(LABROTORIO DE ARTES URBANO, 2013). Through 
programs including instruction on graf iti artwork, 
music, radio broadcasting, and dance as well as 
other artistic media, Tiuna El Fuerte has been able 
to reach a substantial portion of local adolescents 
who do not attend school or participate in athletic 
or cultural activities. Furthermore, Tiuna El Fuerte 
programs encourage youth to amend the spaces 
of the facility to represent the culture of their 
Figure 7 - Labrotorio de Artes Urbano, El Valle, Caracas
Source: BUENADICCION, 2013.urbe. Revista Brasileira de Gestão Urbana (Brazilian Journal of Urban Management), v. 6, n. 2, p. 201-217, maio/ago. 2014
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individual neighborhoods. This ability contributes 
to the development of self-esteem in participants 
and discourages the need for detrimental social 
support or “rituals of masculinity” that often 
result in social violence (UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL 
EXPERIMENTAL DE LA SEGURIDAD, 2011).
Advancing this idea to other public spaces of the 
barrios provides the potential to prevent insecurity. 
Adolescent-developed and managed public spaces 
can reduce direct violence by engaging the youth, 
who are predominantly associated with violence, 
in activities for the conception, implementation, 
control, and management of the public realm. 
Affording adolescents decision-making capacity can 
also encourage greater safety because it reduces 
their experiences of structural violence and could 
likewise assist them in building relationships with 
public authorities and services, which might help to 
prevent acts of violence in the future. Furthermore, 
spaces designed and managed by adolescents are 
likely to facilitate greater use of the public realm by 
this cohort. As previously noted, enhanced public 
activity would facilitate greater surveillance and 
could promote a process of ownership of open space.
Fostering the planning capacity 
of local communities
In a comparable manner, fostering the planning 
capacity of local barrio communities can also enhance 
violence prevention. Programs that delegate greater 
responsibility for management, assessment, and 
decision making regarding daily urban conditions 
in speci ic localities strengthen the bonds of 
cooperative autonomy (DAVIS, 2012). Furthermore, 
the ability to provide care and management for 
shared community infrastructure “[…] can go a 
long way in keeping sustained connections within 
and between citizens and governing authorities 
[…]” (DAVIS, 2012, p. 19). These connections link 
the state and citizens to each other in ways that 
allow increased community autonomy from the 
agents of violence and promote the realization of 
focused practices that directly address the origins 
of insecurity (DAVIS, 2012).
To facilitate greater planning capacity, barrio 
communities could be afforded  inancial and 
professional assistance to realize collectively 
developed spatial intervention. This capacity to 
determine the amenities of local spaces affords 
communities the  lexibility to evolve in accordance 
with changes in the urban environment while 
similarly encouraging local accountability (UNITED 
NATIONS HUMAN SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMME, 
2012). Moreover, enhanced decision-making 
capabilities would directly address structural 
violence, which has excluded the barrios from 
other processes of urban development. Empowering 
local communities could likewise contribute to 
diminishing the deep-seated culture of patronage 
in the Venezuelan capital that has promoted a form 
of political violence between con licting political 
ideologies (ALEMÁN, 2008).
An opportunity for local planning could focus 
on expansion or alteration of the built environment 
as “[…] current rates of population growth suggest 
that another 100,000 [housing] units will be 
needed every year […]” to satisfy the contemporary 
de iciency (BRILLEMBOURG; FEIREISS; KLUMPNER, 
2005, p. 253).
At the current rate of construction, the authorities 
undertaking these projects would need 75 years 
to meet demand; moreover, the various housing 
solutions attempted thus far are too expensive, 
inappropriate, and applied without consultation 
or coordination with the local community. 
(BRILLEMBOURG; FEIREISS; KLUMPNER, 2005, 
p. 253). 
Therefore, communal planning capacity could 
augment processes of densi ication through, for 
example, locally determined yet municipally advised 
community zoning ordinances. Such legislation 
could accommodate the reality of continued barrio 
development while reducing vulnerability due to poor 
self-construction. Precedent can be derived from the 
program Campamentos de Pioneros, which provided 
a platform for citizens who lost their houses during 
the mudslides of 2005 to plan and build their own 
communities with professional assistance (KÜHN, 
2013). The structures incorporated to assist in 
the building process could be applied for similar 
community construction initiatives in existing 
settlements.urbe. Revista Brasileira de Gestão Urbana (Brazilian Journal of Urban Management), v. 6, n. 2, p. 201-217, maio/ago. 2014
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Conclusions
Although the preceding study of Caracas 
predominantly focused on the contemporary 
situation of violence in the Venezuelan capital, 
the rate at which the world is rapidly urbanizing 
and concentrating populations in insecure and 
impoverished sections of cities reinforces the 
value of urban violence research. As metropolitan 
populations across Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, 
and South and Central Asia continue to grow, the 
increasing number of individuals exposed to limited 
resources, competition for employment, dense 
settlement patterns, and the occurrence of crime 
has the propensity to exacerbate the incidence of 
violence. Therefore, mechanisms for the prevention 
of urban insecurity – particularly in currently violent 
and urbanizing regions such as Latin America – will 
be increasingly relevant over the coming decades.
The employment of spatial intervention into 
prevention mechanisms is desirable in this context as 
the redevelopment of the built environment affords 
the capacity to comprehensively address many of 
the multi-level in luences of violence and crime. 
Amendment of the public realm is furthermore a 
mechanism through which governments can engage 
with the communities in which violence concentrates. 
This is important because it affords the capacity 
to prevent occurrences of direct violence. It also 
facilitates government engagement in areas where 
it has been largely absent, which is fundamental 
in addressing the deeper structural or cultural 
experiences of violence that are often characteristic 
of violent and dangerous communities.
Given this potential, national, federal, and 
municipal actors engaged in the Gran Mision 
would do well to optimize spatial intervention in 
Caracas. Protests from the spring of 2014 have 
demonstrated that citizens across the country 
are exasperated by the omnipresence of violence 
in Venezuela. Yet these protests, which have 
concentrated in Caracas, also exemplify social, 
political, and economic differences as well as 
the fragmentation of the capital city “[…] along 
various self-centered spatial identities within an 
interrelated whole […]” (ALEMÁN, 2008, p. 151).
Therefore, violence prevention must address many 
of the intrinsic discrepancies within Venezuelan 
society to prevent insecurity over the long term. 
Although it is acknowledged that spatial intervention 
cannot stop violence on its own, redevelopment 
of the built environment provides the capacity to 
address many of these differences. The ideals of 
openness, indeterminacy,  luidity, coexistence, and 
unassimilated difference “[…] moreover, have found 
some of their best expressions in the public spaces 
of modern cities […]” (CALDEIRA, 2000, p. 303).
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